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Abstract 
The rise of the meso level of government in Europe can be explained by the pressures of 
managing national diversity, functional restructuring and political change. Spain, Italy and 
the United Kingdom all have such a level but taking very different forms. All have embarked 
on a second round of devolution. This differs in kind from the initial decision to devolve 
because new territorial actors play a role. Issues at stake have included issues of symbolic 
recognition, welfare state restructuring and fiscal competition and equity. The process has 
been incremental, with issues dealt with sequentially rather together. The process is 
centrifugal but the role of territorial parties and governments in the process or reform links 
them back into state-wide politics. The territorial dimension of politics is thus strengthened 
and devolution becomes an element in ‘normal politics’. 
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Second Round Reform. Devolution 
and constitutional reform in the 
United Kingdom, Spain and Italy  
 
1. Devolution and the rise of meso government 
All the large countries of Europe and several of the smaller ones have, in recent 
decades, seen the rise of a new ‘regional’ or ‘meso’ level of government (Swenden, 
2006; Keating, 1998). Reasons for this vary from one case to another but there are 
various factors in common. One is the management of national diversity. The United 
Kingdom and Spain are plurinational states, in which rival nation-building projects 
in the periphery present a continual challenge to the central regime. Italy is less 
clearly plurinational but the specific conditions and demands of the island and 
border regions were marked enough to produce special statutes of autonomy after 
the Second World War. To national diversity can be added economic diversity, with 
considerable divergence in productive capacity and wealth, especially between north 
and south in Italy and Spain. While for thirty years after the Second World War, 
these disparities were addressed primarily through centralized regional policies, 
thinking about regional development has gradually changed, to emphasize 
endogenous factors and bottom-up approaches based on enhancing regional 
competitiveness. This has led to regional development policies themselves being 
decentralized and to regions being pitched into competition for investment. State 
reform is another factor, as regional government is seen as a contribution to 
administrative modernization and effectiveness, and a means to relieve the political 
and bureaucratic burden on central governments. More recently, welfare state reform 
has taken on a regional dimension, as states have sought to ration provision in health 
and other social services and to bring together economic development with social 
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support through active labour market policies. The regional level has often been the 
meeting point of these different sectoral initiatives.  
Political trends have also favoured regional devolution. The left, although it has a 
localist tradition, was from the mid-twentieth century rather centralist in its 
orientation, seeing a strong central state as a necessity to redistribute resources and 
guide the economy. Since the 1970s, however, sections of the left have rediscovered 
decentralization and in particular the regional level as a framework for economic and 
social policies. Yet the centre-left is still committed to national standards and 
equality, creating some tensions and inconsistencies. Trade unions have favoured 
regional decentralization but at the same time insisted on a continued national 
framework for labour market regulation and collective bargaining. The centre-right, 
which also has decentralist traditions going back to the nineteenth century, has been 
less keen on the new meso level, although some sections favour it as a way of rolling 
back the central state. Although one might see some affinities between territorial 
devolution and functional retreat of the state, however, neo-liberal parties have 
usually needed a strong state in order to push through their very programme of 
deregulation, while being suspicious of new levels of government, which might seek 
to re-regulate at a new scale. Business interests have in many cases come to look 
favourably on the regional level as an appropriate scale for planning and 
development policies but have almost invariably preferred corporatist forms of 
government, with a strong role for themselves, so avoiding the politicization of the 
region, access by non-business interests and extension of the political agenda beyond 
economic development in its narrow meaning. In all three states, unionists play on 
the problematic experiences of national unity to condemn devolution as the 
precursor of secession.  
The ‘new regionalism’ (Keating, 1998; Cooke and Morgan, 1998) has been another 
influence, showing how functional rescaling is raising the importance of new 
territorial levels and pointing to the need for corresponding forms of regulation and 
political accountability. The ‘vulgar’ version of new regionalism (Lovering, 1999) 
with its invocation of the region as a space in which the otherwise conflicting 
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demands of economic competitiveness and social solidarity can be resolved, has 
attracted the attention of centrist politicians and post-social democrats of ‘third way’ 
tendencies, often inspired by Putnam’s (1993) somewhat reductionist version of the 
concept of social capital. The weak intellectual underpinnings of much of this work 
and the wishful thinking embodied in it does not diminish its appeal to politicians 
looking for ways out of the more painful dilemmas of modern government. In 
practice, the regional level provides another arena for economic and political 
contestation, while the shape of that arena, or the form of regional government, is 
also a matter of contention, since different designs will privilege different interests.  
Party advantage has been recurrent influence. Parties in national opposition tend to 
favour regional decentralization but change their minds after they return to 
government; hence the best time for reform is immediately after a national election.  
In all three states, there are territorial parties committed to constitutional change and 
challenging state-wide parties in state and devolved elections. State-wide parties 
themselves may have territorial sections committed to autonomy, either from 
principle or to compete with territorial challengers. As meso-level government has 
consolidated, it has become a power-base for politicians either to press for more 
autonomy or to operate within national politics. 
 
2. Three systems 
The United Kingdom, Spain and Italy are devolved states, inspired variously by 
these influences but presenting rather different models of meso government. In all 
cases the issue of territorial reform goes back at least until the nineteenth century, but 
change has proved difficult and uneven. The United Kingdom has been a unitary 
state but one that recognized national diversity within state and civil society. After 
more than a hundred years of debate, devolved assemblies were established in 1999 
in Scotland and Wales and restored in Northern Ireland. Progress on regional 
devolution in England stalled twice, in the late 1970s and again in the early 2000s, 
leaving England with only administrative management at the regional level (Hazell, 
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2006). In Spain, autonomist demands from Catalonia, the Basque Country and 
Galicia produced statutes of autonomy in the 1930s, which were rescinded by Franco 
during or after the Civil War. Restoration of democracy in the 1970s produced new 
statutes and, this time, a diffusion of autonomy to the whole of Spain (Aja, 2003). 
Italian regions, debated since unification in the 1860s, were provided for in the post-
war constitution but, apart from the five special-status regions, were not set up until 
1970 and gained competences only slowly after that (Baldi and Baldini, 2006). This 
presents us with three rather different models of devolution. The United Kingdom is 
a highly asymmetrical state, with extensive devolution (in different ways) to the 
three peripheral nations, while England remains under central control. Spain has a 
system in which demands for differentiation from the historical nationalities are 
balanced by catching-up demands from the other regions. In Italy, the special-status 
regions have a distinct range of competences, although there is also a tendency to try 
and catch up. All three systems represent a compromise among the various 
principles outlined above and are continuously under challenge from autonomist, 
centralist and (in some cases) separatist forces.  
 
3. Second round devolution 
In none of the three cases has the devolution settlement stabilized in an agreed 
division of power and influence. There is an institutional dynamic pushing for 
continual adaptation. The division of competences can never be entirely clear or 
perfect, and links among policy fields create new problems, which are then placed on 
the agenda. Resistance from central government departments ensures that 
implementation of devolution is delayed, provoking demands that it be completed. 
Interference by the centre sparks demands for competences to be entrenched. Both 
central and regional parties and individual leaders see advantage in further change, 
to consolidate their power bases. Second-round devolution, however, is a more 
complex process than first-round since there are more actors involved. First-round 
devolution in Italy was largely a top-down process managed by the national parties. 
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In Spain there was more territorial input since statutes of autonomy require a local 
initiative and a scheme drawn up within the limits of the constitutional provision 
and then accepted in the Spanish Parliament. In the United Kingdom, legislative 
initiative is entirely in the hands of the central Parliament, but the Northern Ireland 
settlement was negotiated with local politicians, while in Scotland the way to 
devolution was paved by a civil society initiative, the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention, in the 1990s. The second round differs in two ways: the devolved 
institutions themselves become actors in the process as well as structuring 
opportunities; and the process is taken into the hands of the political class, with less 
involvement of civil society. The process also tends to be incremental and often 
disjointed, as a multiplicity of interests and considerations need to be 
accommodated.  
In Italy, second-round devolution has proceeded haltingly and uncertainly, 
depending largely on partisan considerations. It has also been tied up with wider 
efforts to reform the constitution, introduce a bipolar party system and stabilize 
government. There has been a rather vague commitment to federalism, but the term 
is interpreted in very different ways. For the centre-left, it often seems little more 
than administrative decentralization, although the term does have a historical 
presence in the Italian debate going back to the nineteenth century. The old Christian 
Democrats and their successors had an ideological commitment to subsidiarity but 
were centralist in practice and opposed to anything that might disrupt their 
clientelistic networks. The MSI and its post-fascist successor, Alleanza Nazionale, are 
strongly centralist. From the 1990s a new element was introduced in the Lega Nord, 
which has gyrated from regionalism to federalism to secession and back again. Silvio 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia is centralist in practice, but also very opportunistic and, over 
the years, has incorporated some regional notables who have carved out a power 
base for themselves. The old-line Communists in Rifondazione Comunista remain 
suspicious of regionalism, federalism and weakening of the state. The result of this 
and of coalition politics is that it has been very difficult to achieve agreement on 
reform. The Bicamerale commission (1996-8) included regional devolution in its 
remit but with a rather narrow basis of support; an earlier Bicamerale in the 1980s 
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had ignored it. The Lega were uncooperative and the attempt to get agreement 
between centre-left and centre-right came undone when Berlusconi, who had been 
using the Bicamerale to give him time to get out his legal difficulties, scuttled the 
whole process.  
The next two sets of reforms were pushed through respectively by the centre-left and 
the centre-right, now competing on decentralization but no longer co-operating in its 
pursuit. In parallel with the Bicamerale,  the Prodi government passed the Bassanini 
laws, which transferred new competences to the regions, strengthened mechanisms 
for intergovernmental dialogue, sought to clarify the distribution of powers and the 
legislative role of regions, and assigned various taxes, including part of VAT, 
petroleum duty, and a regional business taxes, to the regions, but without substantial 
discretion over rates or coverage. There was to be an equalization fund for poorer 
regions. The 2001 constitutional reform of 2001 was potentially quite radical. In 
principle, the powers reserved to the state were defined, with everything else left to 
the regions, while the ‘national interest’ clause, allowing central intervention in 
devolved matters, was repealed. In practice, this is nothing like the provision in 
Scotland, since the reserved powers are extensive and detailed, state framework laws 
set the parameters in various fields, there are over-ride powers in social equity, 
environment and competition and there are extensive concurrent powers, potential 
subjects for constitutional litigation (Baldi and Baldini, 2008). Regional governments 
could gain more competences in an asymmetrical way. Health care was devolved in 
order to force regions to rationalize provision and prevent the central government 
bailing them out as happened in the past. Regions gained more powers in economic 
development. There was provision for the direct election of regional presidents, in 
line with efforts to stabilize governments at all levels. Regions were also given some 
freedom to change their electoral systems and internal organization and to gain new 
competences but within strict limits. In practice, little has come of this and there is 
nothing like the Spanish system where regions do draw up their own statutes. The 
reform was approved in a post-legislative referendum but on a low turnout, with the 
centre-right campaigning against and promising a better measure when it returned 
to power, although some of its regional presidents broke ranks to support the 
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proposals. In practice, few regions gained any competences and the process was 
subject to veto by the national Parliament, while the detailed fiscal provisions were 
never unveiled before the government fell.  
The centre-right coalition that came to power under Berlusconi in 2001 was deeply 
divided on autonomy and its proposals sought to satisfy both the Lega, which was 
now committed to something called la devolution (the term borrowed from Scotland) 
and AN, with its centralist preferences (Vassello, 2006). Italy would officially be a 
federal state and regional competences would be extended, but so would national 
control, with the old ‘national interest’ clause reappearing. The Senate would become 
a regional chamber but with reduced competences. At the same time, the role of the 
Prime Minister would be reinforced. A package designed for the Lega Nord under 
the devolution heading gave regions ‘exclusive’ regional competences in health-care 
management, the organization of primary and secondary education, and local 
policing although in practice they were not really exclusive at all. This provision, 
moreover, was inconsistent with other key elements of the legislation. The provision 
for regions to get additional, asymmetrical competences was removed. This package 
was defeated in a referendum in 2006, with a large difference between northern 
regions like Lombardy and Veneto, which voted in favour, and the southern regions, 
which were massively against.  The short-lived succeeding Prodi government did not 
have time to do anything in the field. Returning to power in 2008, in coalition with a 
strengthened Lega Nord, Berlusconi returned to the matter, this time privileging 
‘fiscal federalism’. This achieved all cross-party support, with the centre-left seeing it 
as the culmination of their own 2001 reform while the centre-right presented it as its 
own. The cost of agreement, however, was a remarkable vagueness on what the 
reform would actually do. There is to be a mixture of devolved and assigned taxes 
and a shift from historical expenditure to needs as the basis for fiscal equalization. A 
Bicameral Commission for Fiscal Federalism (15 Deputies, 15 Senators), alongside an 
array of technical commissions will produce detailed proposals. Since fiscal 
equalization is a zero-sum game, this has postponed the battles until the details are 
produced. Meanwhile, Berlusconi has reverted to the old pattern of bailing out 
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regions and localities (controlled by his allies) that have got themselves into financial 
problems.  
A decade of regional reform in Italy has thus produced rather little of substance. 
There has been some real devolution in the management of health and social 
services, but no proper fiscal reform. Bold declarations in constitutional reforms or 
laws have not been followed up with the necessary implementing laws and decrees, 
while the central parliament has continued often to legislate as though nothing had 
happened. The profile of some regional leaders has been raised through direct 
election and the crisis of the old political class but in parts of the south regional 
government has provided a refuge for elements of the old regime who have lost their 
foothold at the centre (Wilson, 2009). The reform process has played out at the centre, 
with relatively little involvement from the regions themselves. 
In Spain, second-round reform is also dominated by party politics, although with a 
stronger role for regional governments, so that the process is played at at both 
territorial levels. The Spanish electoral system is strongly biased against small 
parties, unless they are territorially concentrated. As a result, it is difficult for either 
socialists (PSOE) or conservatives (PP) to gain an absolute majority and both have 
been obliged to deal with nationalists in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and 
the Canaries. Generally, PSOE has been divided between devolutionist elements, 
particularly strong in Catalonia, where the party itself has a degree of autonomy, and 
centralists, entrenched in the party’s strongholds in the south. PP has been quite 
resolutely centralist although forced to go along with autonomy. Its regional leaders 
have sometimes taken a lead in autonomist demands and it also has a territorial 
affiliate in Navarre, UPN, which is provincialist but anti-Basque nationalist. The 
strongest autonomist demands come from the Basque Country but in the long period 
during which the Basque Government was dominated by the nationalist party (PVN) 
relations with Madrid were strained, especially after 2004, when Basque president 
Ibarretxe was pursuing a radical plan of sovereignty-association, which could not be 
accommodated within the Spanish constitution (Keating and Bray, 2004). Catalan 
nationalists, on the other hand, have been much more inclined to negotiate within 
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the constitution, stretching its interpretation to the limits. Constitutional reform thus 
tends to be led by Catalonia, with the other autonomous communities then seeking 
to gain parity. The development of the autonomous system has thus proceeded in 
phases. In the 1980s there was a series of pacts at the centre between PSOE and PP, 
seeking to harmonize the competences of autonomous communities and limit the 
process, although the most drastic limitations in the LOAPA (Ley de armonización del 
processo autonómico) were struck down by the Constitutional Court. During the 1990s, 
successive minority PSOE governments were supported by both PNV and the 
Catalan CiU in return for concessions. For the Catalans, this took the form of the 
concession first of 15 per cent and then of 30 per cent of personal income tax, a 
measure extended to all regions except the Basque Country and Navarre (which 
already have full fiscal autonomy). The concession was extended to all autonomous 
communities and accompanied by a further transfer of competences. This phase was 
closed with the victory of PP by absolute majority in the elections of 2000. In 2004 
PSOE returned to power without a majority, forcing it back into reliance on the 
territorial parties. Around the same time, the moderately nationalist and centre-right 
CiU lost office in Catalonia to a coalition of the Catalan socialists, the more radical ly 
nationalist and leftist ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) and the post-
Communist and Green formation Iniciativa per Catalunya –Verds. This both opened 
up the Spanish political space for a new Catalan statute of autonomy and committed 
the Catalan socialists to produce one, allowing them incidentally to outflank the CiU. 
Since the Spanish constitution requires both a local initiative and acceptance by the 
Spanish Parliament, these were two essential conditions for statute reform, although 
the Catalan PP opposed Catalan the reform, as did the PP at the Spanish level. In 
four regions (the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and Andalucia), statute reform 
also requires a referendum.1 The opening in Catalonia was then used by five other 
autonomous communities to pursue their own proposals. In some cases, this was 
done by consensus between the Spanish-wide parties operating in the region. In 
others statute reform was blocked because of the failure to agree. In Galicia, a 
coalition of socialists and nationalists (Bloque Nacionalista Galego) could not gain 
                                                        
1
 This is because these regions proceeded originally according to the fast-track provisions of article 151 
of the constitution.  
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the necessary parliamentary support because of opposition from the local PP. In 
Andalucia the PP dithered on reform, eventually coming down against it, but PSOE 
had a sufficient majority in any case. As in Italy, political opportunism played a big 
role in the attitudes of the parties. So the PP opposed a series of articles in the 
Catalan statute of autonomy, appealing them to the Constitutional Court while 
supporting identical articles in the Andalucian statute (Lamarca and Casado, 2006). 
While there are some differences in the statutes of individual regions due to the way 
they are negotiated individually, there is a tendency to convergence and to imitation 
(Keating and Wilson, 2008).  
The largest anomalies are without doubt in the area of finance, since each region 
tried to write in a funding and equalization formula favourable to itself, producing a 
hotch-potch of conflicting criteria. This issue was passed to the Consejo de Política 
Fiscal y Financiera (CPFF), in which the state and the autonomous communities each 
have half the votes. After much deliberation, agreement was reached (with the 
abstention of regions governed by the PP) on a new funding formula; this was in July 
2009, with the outcome backdated to the start of the year and looking forward to 
2012, but it still had to be approved by Parliament and in the various bilateral 
committees. There is a new equalization fund, 75 per cent of which is dedicated to 
reaching national standards in the key areas of health, education and social services, 
while the rest is in the form of a block grant. There is a distribution formula 
including needs and population. At the same time the devolution or assignment of 
income tax VAT and excise taxes is extended to 50 per cent, with some more freedom 
over the rates (Torres, 2009).  
Second-round reform in the United Kingdom also involves a mixture of central and 
local initiative and is subject to part competition and bargaining across the 
ideological and territorial divides. The statutes of autonomy for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland are formally ordinary acts of the UK Parliament that can be 
changed at any time without any special procedure. Yet the Northern Ireland 
settlement is also part of an international agreement, while all three were ratified by 
referendum, suggesting that the people of these territories are regarded as at least 
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partially self-determining. In any case, the existence of elected assemblies in all three 
territories ensures that they will henceforth be actors in any process of change 
Opposition to further devolution has come from Scottish and Welsh MPs at 
Westminster. These were long ago identified as an obstacle, since there 
representative and brokerage role would be, and has been, undermined by 
devolution (Keating,1978). The UK political parties are divided on the issue. Labour 
has always harboured pro- and anti-devolution elements but since 1999 and 
especially since the victory of the Scottish National Party in the 2007 Scottish 
elections, it has strongly stressed its unionist credentials. It is also conscious that, in 
order to win UK elections it needs to do well in the south of England, and cannot 
appear too favourable to peripheral interests. The Conservatives, opposed to Scottish 
and Welsh devolution in the 1990s, have now accepted it, although they did at one 
point propose a referendum to abolish the Welsh assembly. Lacking a significant 
parliamentary presence in Scotland and Wales, they do not have to worry about their 
local backbenchers the way that Labour does. They are also open to considering 
fiscal autonomy as a way of demonstrating to English voters that Scotland and Wales 
are not being subsidized.  
Statute reform in Wales stemmed from the very nature of the 1998 legislation, which 
devolved only administrative powers and secondary legislation, not primary 
legislation as in Scotland. So from the very beginning there were demands for law-
making authority. The original plans also provided for a weak, collegial executive 
not separate from the assembly itself and, while it was strengthened during the 
passage of the legislation, further reform was needed to create what is now officially 
the Welsh Assembly Government. In Scotland, the main defect in the original 
legislation was the lack of fiscal autonomy. Although voters had responded 
favourably to a second question on the referendum ballot proposing tax-raising 
powers, the governing Labour Party limited this to the ability to raise or lower the 
standard rate of income tax by three pence in the pound, a power that for political 
and administrative reasons is virtually unusable.  
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An opening for change in Wales occurred when Labour lost its majority and entered 
into coalition with the federalist Liberal Democrats. One condition was a commission 
on the future of devolution, which was appointed under the Labour peer Lord 
Richard and proposed a gradual move to legislative powers. The outcome, under the 
Government of Wales Act of 2006, was a very complicated system under which the 
National Assembly for Wales can ask Westminster for authority to legislate in a 
particular field through a Legislative Competence Order. After a set period, the 
Assembly can then hold a referendum on moving to full legislative powers. 
Following the 2007 Welsh elections, a new coalition was formed between Labour and 
the nationalists of Plaid Cymru (something more familiar from Spanish than from 
British politics) with a commitment to a referendum when the time is right. Polls so 
far show the prospect only of a narrow victory. The National Assembly for Wales 
also commissioned a review of the funding formula which, not surprisingly, showed 
that Wales was short-changed (Independent Commission on Funding & Finance for 
Wales, 2009). 
In Scotland, the political offer is more polarized. The Scottish National Party is 
pledged to independence after a referendum. On forming a minority government in 
2007, it issued a White Paper proposing independence but indicating that it would be 
willing to put a second question, about enhanced devolution, on the ballot paper. It 
then launched a consultation process or ‘national conversation’, which was shunned 
by the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. These latter, adopting the 
term ‘unionist’, were, however, forced into a counter-move. This took the form of a 
resolution in the Scottish Parliament (in which they together command a majority) to 
establish their own Commission on Scottish Devolution (the Calman Commission) 
with representatives from the three parties and non-political members. Its remit was 
to consider constitutional change but excluding the independence option. Although 
this was ostensibly a home-grown response with the legitimacy of the Scottish 
Parliament behind it, the process was soon taken over by Westminster. The Labour 
Government re-appointed a full-time Secretary of State in the Cabinet (the post had 
been downgraded to part-time after devolution and had been expected to disappear). 
The Calman Commission was given central government funding and a secretariat 
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based in the UK Department of Justice. Proposals were cleared by UK government 
departments before the final report of the commission was issued (Commission on 
Scottish Devolution, 2009). The outcome was a very cautious set of proposals, with 
some enhancement of fiscal autonomy. At the time of writing, there is no sign of 
convergence of the two processes, national conversation and Calman. 
UK devolution is thus proceeding in a piecemeal fashion. The debates in Scotland 
and Wales are quite separate, although Welsh demands for legislative powers are 
inspired by the Scottish example. Northern Irish devolution is going on a separate 
track again, given the distinct problems of the province and the involvement of the 
Republic of Ireland. The debate on English regional devolution stalled after the failed 
referendum of 2004, giving way to a discussion of city-regions, a concept that relates 
to the internal management of England rather than the balance of the United 
Kingdom as a whole.  
The procedures for devolutionary reform vary among our three cases, from a simple 
parliamentary act in the United Kingdom to a constitutionally-prescribed form in 
Spain. Spanish autonomy statutes are organic laws requiring qualified majorities. In 
Italy constitutional reform itself may be required, in which case there are qualified 
majority requirements and, where opponents demand it, either an affirmative or 
abrogative referendum. At the limit, it is possible in all cases for a cartel of state-wide 
parties to push through changes unilaterally, and this has underlain recentralizing 
efforts on various occasions. Yet this has become progressively more difficult for 
three reasons. First, there are institutional factors like the formal role of Spanish 
autonomous communities in initiating statute reform or the de facto need for the 
consent of the Scottish and Welsh bodies to extensions in their own powers. Second 
is the fact that the state-wide parties are now less likely to agree. Third is the role of 
territorial parties, which have emerged as veto players. So there is an increasing need 
for an alignment of forces at both central and devolved levels and an articulation 
between the levels. The Spanish system, with its majority requirements, periodically 
creates such opportunities while blocking them at other times. In Italy, polarizing 
between the two blocks since the demise of the ‘First Republic’ has allowd the Lega 
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Nord to emerge as a veto player. In the United Kingdom, the state-wide parties have 
never in the past agreed on a programme of change and devolution only happened 
because a party that had an inherited commitment to it gained a large parliamentary 
majority and acted quickly. Now for the first time they have formed a unionist front 
to isolate the Scottish nationalists, but will find it hard to proceed as long as the 
nationalists control the Scottish government. In Wales, multilevel politics is most 
advanced, with the nationalists accepted as coalition partners by all the other 
parties2, and prepared to bargain for more devolution rather than insisting on 
independence. There is a further obstacle in Spain and Italy in that reforms may be 
referred to the constitutional courts.  
 
4. The issues at stake 
Statute reform in the three countries undoubtedly has a lot to do with party 
advantage and short-term manoeuvring and it is sometimes difficult to see consistent 
principles in play. Certain issues do, however, recur. One is to do with semantics and 
symbolism. This is particularly notable in the Spanish case. Nationalists in the 
historic nationalities have been insistent on recognition as more than regions. The 
Constitution of 1978 proclaims the indissoluble union of the Spanish nation and the 
‘nationalities and regions’ that comprise it, while carefully avoiding specifying which 
communities are which. The three historic nationalities adopted the term until the PP 
government, bargaining for support, allowed Aragon and the Canaries to 
incorporate it in their statutes, upon which the three started to ask for recognition as 
nations. The new statutes have a variety of more or less convoluted formulations, 
with the Catalan one noting in the preamble that the Catalan Parliament recognizes 
Catalonia as a nation even if Spain does not. There has also been a generalization of 
claims to historic rights, an issue originally of importance only to the Basques, 
although mentioned also in the original statute for Aragon. This was raised in the 
                                                        
2
 This was made clear in 2007 when a Conservative-Liberal Democrat-Plaid Cymru coalition almost 
came about.  
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Catalan debate by CiU to avoid being outflanked by the ERC. The ratified version of 
the Andalucian Statute also confirms it as a ‘historical nationality’, after the PP made 
its support in the national parliament conditional on removing the term ‘national 
reality’ from the first Article, although the preamble nevertheless refers to the 
‘Manifiesto Andalucista de Córdoba in 1919 that described Andalusia as a national 
reality.’ Such issues are less prevalent in the United Kingdom, where there has never 
been any dispute about the national status of Scotland and Wales, as opposed to the 
implications of it. There were some attempts to downgrade the titles of Scottish 
institutions. The 1970s devolution proposals had provided for a Scottish Assembly, 
seen as a less sovereign body than a Parliament, but the change to Parliament in 1998 
attracted little controversy. Labour politicians happily signed up to the 1988 Claim of 
Right (CSA, 1998), which rehearsed the old claim that the Scottish people, not the 
Westminster Parliament, were the source of sovereignty, and ten years later as 
happily passed the Scotland Act, which asserted the opposite. The 1998 Act 
deliberately named the executive authority the Scottish Executive with Labour 
politicians insisting that to call it a Government would be confusing (even though we 
talk unproblematically about municipal government). The incoming SNP 
administration simply changed the title without seeking statutory authority, without 
much controversy. The title National Assembly for Wales (not of Wales) is a carefully 
constructed compromise, mentioning nationality but without sovereignty. It was a 
Labour First Minister who called the executive the Welsh Assembly Government, a 
title later registered in legislation. In Italy, these issues have less resonance but there 
is a lot semantic confusion in the debate as parties seek to appropriate concepts or to 
legitimize their positions with reference to them. The concept of federalism has been 
considerably stretched and generally abused and the use of the term ‘devolution’ 
strikes outsiders as positively bizarre. In the United Kingdom, devolution implies 
that power is both transferred and retained, as Westminster remains sovereign; 
indeed supporters of strong autonomy disdain the term and prefer self-government 
or the older home rule.  
In the Spanish and Italian cases, there has been a lot of talk of exclusive competences. 
Literally interpreted, this would mean that only the region exercises a particular 
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competence, with the central government shut out. In practice, it hardly ever does 
seem to mean this but rather suggests that the region should have control over the 
entire field, but without excluding a central government role; a better term might be 
inclusive competence. In practice, the debate is mainly about limiting the centre’s 
ability to intervene in devolved matters and limiting framework laws or national 
guidelines to the minimum. Spanish statutes often mention blindaje, or shielding of 
devolved competences from central interventions or modifications. This has not 
featured much in the UK debate, despite the fact that Westminster insists on its right 
to legislate freely even in devolved fields. One reason is that the division of 
competences, especially in Scotland, is fairly clear and, as the devolved  bodies 
inherited the old territorial administrative machinery, the centre does not have the 
capacity to intervene. Indeed it is illegal for a London minister to act or spend money 
in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland except in relation to a competence reserved to 
the centre in the legislation. They would not have an incentive to spend in the 
devolved territories even if they could, since this would merely divert money from 
the English programmes for which they are responsible. Moreover, since devolution, 
Westminster has respected the division of powers and only legislated for devolved 
Scottish matters in response to a request from the Scottish Parliament in the form of a 
Legislative Consent Motion.  
Arguments about the division of competences vary from one case to another, but 
there are common themes. Serious debate on the appropriate level at which to locate 
particular policy competences has been rather scarce. It featured little in the Spanish 
debate, while the Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009) produced an eclectic list 
of items with no apparent underlying logic. Indeed, it is difficult, when proceeding 
incrementally, to identify individual items to transfer, since it can be argued that any 
one is too closely linked to another, reserved competence. There is also tendency to 
devolve items in principle but them claw them back in practice but subjecting them 
to national standards. One theme that does emerge is to do with social solidarity and 
its boundaries and modalities. While there are few demands for a decentralization of 
the basic income support measures and cash transfers, regions do often want to craft 
the details of their own welfare settlement, enabling them to target particular groups. 
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This might be a matter of policy choice or simply a desire to increase resources for 
clientelistic distribution. Again, however, it is easy to argue that individual measures 
are linked to national programmes and so cannot effectively be devolved. 
Devolved governments in wealthier regions have argued for fiscal devolution to 
enhance their operational autonomy and (more or less explicitly) keep more of their 
own resources. This is an insistent demand in Catalonia and Northern Italy as well as 
in Scotland (where oil revenues come into the picture). Regions in southern Spain 
and southern Italy, along with Wales, have been much less keen on this idea and 
inclined to accept it only if accompanied by guarantees of fiscal equalization. Taxes 
available for devolution come in four forms: Value Added Tax; business taxes; excise 
duties; and miscellaneous minor taxes. Given that VAT is regulated by the EU and 
cannot be varied within states, it has been assigned in Spain and (as proposed) Italy. 
Business taxes are difficult to devolve since there is a risk of market distortion and 
the European Commission is suspicious of variable rates as a form of state aid. They 
are devolved in the Basque Country and Navarre, but in Italy the Berlusconi 
government proposes to abolish the IRAP, an unpopular business tax that is one of 
the main sources of revenue for regional governments. Personal income tax is easier 
and 50 per cent of this has been devolved in Spain (the whole amount in the Basque 
Country and Navarre). The Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009) 
recommended the devolution of half the income tax, with control over the rates, 
together with some minor taxes. The Welsh Commission, however, postponed the 
issue, preferring to focus on fiscal transfers. A proportion of VAT in Spain is 
assigned to the regions. An unspecified proportion of VAT and income tax is going 
to be assigned or devolved under Italy’s fiscal federalism. Motor vehicle duties are 
devolved in Spain. Other minor taxes, especially to do with immovable property, are 
devolved or proposed for devolution in all three countries.  
Fiscal devolution in itself tells us little about the amounts of money available unless 
we take equalization into account. This is, not surprisingly, the most difficult issue of 
all. Territorial redistribution in the past was often implicit, the result of national 
programmes benefiting citizens equally in spite of differences in the tax contribution 
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of different places. The development of regional government and the politicization of 
the regional space make the issue altogether more salient.  Changing conceptions of 
regional development and the opening of European and global markets have pitched 
regions into competition with each other, although the extent to which this 
competition is real as opposed to politically constructed is debatable (Lovering, 
1999). New and reinvigorated territorial identities may be undermining old 
conceptions of ‘national’ or state-wide solidarity.3 Regional politicians, faced with the 
declining efficacy of older means or electoral mobilization, have emphasized their 
role as defenders of a territorial interest, thus enlarging their potential constituency 
to all residents. In wealthier regions, they argue that they cannot afford to finance 
transfers to poor regions, given their own need to compete internationally. This 
rarely takes the form of refusing transfers outright, since the idea of inter-territorial 
solidarity still carries some resonance. Rather they argue that transfers should be 
transparent and limited so that, for example, poor regions should not end up, after 
equalization, with more spending capacity than the richer ones. Of course the 
direction of the argument is still clear, towards a reduction in fiscal transfers. 
Politicians in richer regions also argue that excessive transfers are not in the interests 
of the poor regions themselves, as it stifles initiative and traps them into dependency.  
Translating these demands into practical policy is more difficult and there is 
considerable confusion as regions have sought to frame their proposals to their own 
advantage. The various Spanish statutes of autonomy have sought to incorporate 
equalization formulas in their own interests, favouring variously population, 
population density, population sparsity, immigration, average age and historic 
under-funding. The Catalan statute provides that equalization should not alter 
Catalonia’s ranking in the revenues per capita. Several regions staked claims to a 
specific share of state investment. Some regions have also claimed that they are owed 
a ‘historic debt’, due to under-financing over the years. One of the most contentious 
inter-territorial issues in Spain is water and several of the statutes originally specified 
a defined quantity of water to be extracted from the main rivers. While the Valencian 
statute sought a specific share of the flowing through the river Ebro, the Andalucian 
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 The evidence on this is so far inconclusive, although new research is seeking to clarify the matter.  
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statute sought management of the Guadalquivir and claimed the region had a right 
to a minimum 6550 cubic hectometres of water.  The Italian Lega Nord has fixed on 
the formula of ‘fiscal federalism’ as though this were a specific policy rather than a 
general field of policy. This allows them to suggest that the northern regions will 
gain, without completely alienating their national coalition partners whose power 
bases lie in the south. The Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009), run by the 
unionist parties, avoided the question altogether, recommending that the existing 
Barnett formula4 (which is rather favourable to Scotland) be retained for the time 
being. The Welsh Commission, on the other hand, argued for Barnett to be replaced 
by a new formula on the grounds that, according to its own (rough) calculations, 
Wales now received less than it would do from a needs-based approach 
(Independent Commission on Funding & Finance for Wales, 2009).  
None of the states has been able so far to resolve the issue of fiscal equalization. In 
Spain during the 1980s and 1990s autonomous communities were allowed to 
accumulate debts (having started off debt-free) and, through the key position of the 
Basque and Catalan nationalists in state-wide politics, to obtain further state support. 
In Italy, the lack of fiscal discipline was notorious. The need to meet the convergence 
criteria for European monetary union produced some agreed tightening in both 
cases, but without resolving the issue completely. Devolution in the United Kingdom 
coincided with a sustained period of large increases in public expenditure so that the 
main problem was under-spending. All three countries now face a period of fiscal 
austerity, which will make the question all the more urgent. Italy has embraced the 
concept of fiscal federalism but in way that gives hope to both donor and recipient 
regions, with the crucial details unresolved. In Spain, the central state has 
progressively ceded taxes and borne an increasing share of fiscal equalization. 
Successive equalization formulas have been based on need criteria but are heavily 
informed by political considerations and the weight of autonomous communities 
and parties. In the United Kingdom, key decisions about spending levels are on hold 
pending the general election due in 2010.  
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 The Barnett formula takes existing expenditure levels as the base and then distributes increases or 
cuts among Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on a population basis. 
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There is a recurrent concern about maintaining national standards in welfare services 
and the dangers of a ‘race to the bottom’ as regions, competing for investment, cut 
taxes and either cut services or, pleading poverty, ask central government to make 
up the balance. The new agreement on funding in Spain includes a recommendation 
that regions not use equalization funds to engage in tax competition but this is not 
binding. Spain and Italy have moved towards minimum standards in core services 
(livelli essenziali di assistenza, servicios públicos fundamentales) rather than equalizing for 
whatever regional governments chose to provide. This issue has also surfaced in the 
UK debate, where the Calman Commission on Scottish Devolution (2009) 
recommends that both UK and Scottish Parliaments made a pledge to respect core 
public services free at the point of use. It is difficult to see what this can mean in 
practice, as the devolved administrations have in practice been engaged in a ‘race to 
the top’ and Westminster retains the right unilaterally to reduce funding.  
 
5. Intergovernmental relations 
Intergovernmental relations in all three cases have been dominated by informal 
mechanisms and, above all, the political parties. There is a general recognition that 
this is inadequate and that more structured procedures should be put in place. There 
are proposals in all three cases for better coordination on sectoral policy matters, 
although issues of power are not directly addressed; it is assumed rather than these 
would work by consensus or deal with technical issues. Existing bodies, such as the 
UK’s Joint Ministerial Committees, the Spanish sectoral conferences and the Italian 
state-regions commission, are prime candidates for reinforcement. Stronger regions 
or historic nationalities have tended to favour bilateral rather than multilateral 
arrangements. This has been a pronounced feature of Basque and Catalan demands, 
although other revised Spanish statutes also have bilateral provisions.  
In all three countries, there are proposals to strengthen territorial representation in 
the second chamber. The Spanish Senate does have a territorial representation role 
but is largely elected from the provinces, with members sent from the autonomous 
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communities comprising only about a fifth of the membership. The Italian Senate is 
elected on a regional basis but does not represent the regional governments and has 
competences that mirror almost exactly that of the chamber of deputies. The UK 
House of Lords is a largely appointed body, although it still has some 90 hereditary 
peers and 26 bishops of the Church of England. In no case, however, has a proposal 
for a territorial second chamber succeeded. National governments fear that such a 
chamber might be too powerful, it is very difficult to agree on modes of election 
(whether directly or by delegation from the regions) and powerful regions are 
lukewarm on the idea, since it would dilute their influence and favour the formation 
of a broad pan-regional interest as a whole. The failed Italian constitutional reform of 
2006 did envisage a regional senate, whose power would be reduced and focused on 
regional and constitutional issues, but in Spain and the UK the debate has not even 
reached the stage of legislative proposals.  
More generally, central elites in the three states have sought to avoid explicit 
federalization of the state in the sense of strengthening the territorial dimension of 
the state itself. Devolution has allowed the territories greater autonomy in decision-
making within their own sphere but without prejudicing the autonomy of the centre 
from territorial influences. In Spain and, even more, in Italy, local government has 
remained a competence of the central state, with direct links by-passing the regional 
level, so militating against a truly federal reform.  
During the 1990s the debate about regional devolution was closely linked with that 
about European integration. There was a fear that competences gained under 
devolution could be lost to Europe or back to the state, as it is the states that are 
represented in the Council of Ministers, even when it is dealing with devolved 
matters.  While initially this made some regionalists suspicious of Europe, attitudes 
gradually changed to embrace Europe as a new field of action. The Europe of the 
Regions concept was perhaps poorly developed but the general idea was that supra-
national and sub-state rescaling were complementary and that devolved territories 
should find a distinct place in the new European architecture.  The high point of the 
movement was the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which established the 
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Committee of the Regions and allowed regional representatives to attend the Council 
of Ministers where permitted by state regulations and representing the state as a 
whole. The failure to make further progress in the Convention on the Future of 
Europe and the subsequent constitutional and Lisbon treaties led to a certain 
disillusionment and a focus instead on influencing state governments and getting to 
Europe through them. Second round reforms have been notable for their lack of 
rhetoric around the Europe of the Regions and new opportunities, but they have 
tended to involve practical mechanisms for ensuring regional influence over states’ 
European negotiating positions.  
 
6. The dynamics of reform 
Decentralization in all three countries is a process that creates its own dynamics, as 
new agents are brought into being, new issues emerge and regions are constituted 
both as systems of action and as actors in a new form of territorial competition. 
Competition over resources is, as noted, ubiquitous. Competition over status is 
prevalent in Spain where every advance in recognition or powers by the historic 
nationalities generates demands for parity (Moreno, 1997). A clause in the Valencian 
Statute, the ‘Camps Clause’, allows it to re-align its level of competences or fiscal 
arrangements to reflect those of other Spanish regions (Orte, 2007). The state has 
conceded many of these demands in the interest of symmetry but this provokes the 
historic nationalities in turn to reassert their special status, or hecho diferencial. There 
is something of the same process in Italy, where the special status regions set the 
standard, although regions in the south have been much less keen on seeking 
autonomy than those in the north. The case of the United Kingdom is quite different. 
Although there have been efforts in Wales to match the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament, there has been no generalization of autonomy demands. The movement 
for regional government in England, which started partly as a response to Scottish 
devolution and an effort to take advantage of it (in contrast to the 1970s when they 
simply opposed Scottish devolution), has signally failed. This might support the 
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argument of Herrero de Miñon (1998) in the Spanish case, that an explicit definition 
of the state as plurinational, with clearly demarcated differences in status, might 
actually reduce the amount of conflict, although this has so far not convinced elites 
outside the historic nationalities.  
This competition over autonomy sets up a centrifugal dynamic in the states 
concerned, but it is balanced by integrative forces. The incorporation of territorial 
parties into national government through coalition (in Italy) or external support (in 
Spain) links them back into national politics and restrains separatist tendencies. 
Inter-party accommodation in the very different circumstances of Northern Ireland 
and Wales has resulted in nationalist parties serving in unionist governments, 
parking their long-term ambitions for the time being. So while the territorial cleavage 
has challenged national political systems it has also been incorporated as a ‘normal’ 
part of domestic politics rather than an existential challenge.  
After the initial move to set up autonomous governments, there has been no further 
‘big bang’. Decentralization has been caught up in other stalled constitutional issues, 
such as the debate on state reform in Italy or the eternal debate about formalizing the 
constitution in the United Kingdom. Canadian experience suggests that, as the 
number of actors and issues multiplies, reform of the territorial constitution becomes 
impossible. Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom have not yet reached this stage, but 
the complexity of the issue suggests that future reforms will be incremental and often 
disjointed rather than following a grand design. Issues will be dealt with 
sequentially, generating problems and anomalies that lead in turn to the next reform. 
This suggests that constitutional politics will not be a once-in-generation 
phenomenon leading to a period of stability but part of the political mainstream. The 
question of inter-territorial equity, which is not strictly a constitutional issue, is likely 
to become even more important but in the absence of agreed principles on how to do 
it, will also be dealt with by incremental adjustments and compromises.   
Rescaling at the substate level continues to be influenced by the parallel process of 
transnational integration. Were the European integration process to receive a boost in 
the future, the place of regions in the new order would again be posed. Even in the 
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absence of formal recognition as actors in the European game, some regions are 
better linked to European networks than others or better placed to compete within 
the single market. This is likely to place further strain on state-level territorial 
compromises and keep the issue of territorial autonomy on the political agenda.  
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